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My remarks today will focus on the second trial of the Iraqi High Tribunal
(the IHT or Tribunal), the so-called "Anfal" trial.' In contrast to the IHT's first
trial, the "Dujail" trial, which involved a relatively small instance of crimin-
ality 2-given the vast scope of crimes committed during Ba'ath Party rule 3-the
* Ms. Trahan has served as both Counsel and Of Counsel to the International Justice Program of
Human Rights Watch, as Iraq Prosecutions Consultant for the International Center for Transitional Justice,
and as a Defense Consultant to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. She has been a Visiting Lecturer with
Columbia University's Masters in Human Rights Program, and an Adjunct Professor at N.Y.U.'s Center for
Global Affairs, Fordham Law School, Brooklyn Law School and The New School. She is the author, inter
alia, of Justicefor Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper (December 2002) and Genocide, War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch 2006). These remarks were delivered, and this publication is
submitted, in an individual capacity. The Author would like to thank Marieke Wierda, Miranda
Sissons, William Wiley, Nehal Bhuta, Eric H. Blinderman, Michael A. Newton and Patricia Wildermuth for
their insightful discussions which helped inform the author about the IHT's work. The author's consultancy
with the International Center for Transitional Justice also greatly facilitated the author's research.
1. This publication consists of an annotated version of the original remarks. The findings
presented herein are also the subject of a much more detailed law review article by the Author. See Jennifer
Trahan, A Critical Guide To The Iraqi High Tribunal's AnfalJudgment: Genocide Against The Kurds, 30
Mich. J. Int'l L. 305 (2009).
2. The Dujail trial involved an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein and the resulting
crack-down on the people of Dujail in retaliation. Approximately 146 individuals were killed (some under
torture and some by execution), and several hundred townspeople were sent to a prison camp in the desert.
See INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, DUJAIL: TRIAL AND ERROR? 2 (2006),
http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/ICTJDujailBrief.eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
3. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR IRAQ (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http:l/www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql2l7bg.htm (last visited February 17,2009) (discussing attacks
against the Iraqi Kurds; forced expulsion of ethnic minorities from Kirkuk; repression of the Marsh Arabs
and other Shi'a; general repression, large-scale "disappearances" and other crimes; the use of chemical
weapons during the Iran-Iraq war; and the occupation of Kuwait and related abuses).
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"Anfal" trial was a much more significant trial. The eight-phased "Anfal
campaign" against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 resulted in an estimated death toll
of 182,000. 4 In this presentation, I will provide: i) an overview of the trial
process; ii) an evaluation of the Trial Chamber Judgment; iii) a discussion of
fair trial issues that arose during the trial; and iv) a critical evaluation of the
Cassation Chamber (appellate level) Judgment.5 The presentation concludes
that the evidence presented was quite solid and the Trial Chamber Judgment
was generally well-reasoned; however, fair trial issues were not properly
resolved and the Cassation Chamber decision appears to be wholly lacking in
merit.6
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TRIAL
During the trial, seventy-seven "complainants" testified, presenting truly
horrific, graphic testimony.7 The complainants generally testified to one or
more aspects of the Anfal campaign: i) military strikes, using conventional
weapons and "special ammunitions"-that is chemical weapons-against
villagers in the "prohibited zones" in Northern Iraq; ii) survivors driven to
prison camps, where they were subjected to deplorable conditions, including
torture and rape, and many additionally died; and iii) mass executions in the
desert, with bodies plowed under by bulldozers.'
A few individuals, who were accidentally buried along with the corpses
and mistaken for dead at the mass graves, crawled out and survived to testify. 9
The Trial Chamber judges observed that many of those who testified still had
respiratory problems due to chemical gas attacks, bore scars on their bodies,
and suffered from psychological harm caused by time spent in prison.'" Most
complainants also testified to having lost numerous family members during the
4. Case No. 1/ CSecond/2006, Al Anfal, Trial Chamber Judgment, at 501, June 24,2007 available
at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp (last visited Feb. 24,2009) [hereinafter Trial
Chamber Judgment].
5. Case No. 1/CSecond/2006, Al Anfal, Cassation Chamber Judgment, Sept. 4, 2007 available
at http://Iaw.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/AnfalCassation-Pane-_pinion.pdf(last visited Feb.
24, 2009) [hereinafter Cassation Chamber Judgment].
6. See Trahan, supra note 1.
7. See Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 146-212 (recounting their testimony).
8. Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], The Anfal Trial and the Iraqi High Tribunal Update
Number One: The Complainant Phase of the Anfal Trial, at 8-9, http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/
AnfalUpdateOne.eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) [hereinafter ICTJ, Update 1].
9. See, e.g., ICTJ, Update I, supra note 8, at 9-10 (summarizing testimony of Taymur Abdallah
Ahmad).
10. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 505.
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Anfal." In fact, fatalities were so numerous that a term was developed to
describe the victims: the "Anfalized.' ' 2
The case was supported by strong documentary evidence. Some of this
first came to light when withdrawing Iraqi forces left a trove of documents in
Kurdish areas, and individuals brought them to the attention of Human Rights
Watch, which, with the help of the United States Government, had them
brought to the United States. 3 Human Rights Watch analyzed the documents,
arguing, years before the second Gulf War, that Iraq should have faced civil
genocide claims before the International Court of Justice. 4
Two of the key documents used at trial contained written orders by
Defendant Ali-Hassan al-Majid (Majid) 5 to perpetrate the campaign. 6 The
first document, dated June 3, 1987, was issued by the Northern Organization
Office (headed by Majid), and ordered that "supplies of food and medicine to
the Kurdish villages were prohibited in addition to agriculture,... human
beings and animals .... In the second document, dated June 20, 1987, Majid
ordered the military commanders to prohibit human and animal existence in
certain areas, and to kill every person whose age was between fifteen and
seventy years, and requested the Army Corps Commanders to carry out special
strikes (using chemical weapons).' 8
Evidence also came in the form of audio-tapes played at trial, including
statements by Majid (also know as "Chemical Ali"): "when I strike them with
the chemical I will cause them high casualties . . . and I will not strike them
with chemical .. .only one day, but (15) days, two days, ten, five and so
11. See, e.g., id. at 504.
12. Id. at 565.
13. "Human Rights Watch was able to obtain access to eighteen tons of Iraqi government
documents seized by Kurds from Iraqi police, security, and intelligence headquarters during March 1991,
which were airlifted to Washington and analyzed." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
14. See Kenneth Roth, Indict Saddam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002 at A14.
15. The IHT found that Majid served as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, State
Command of the Ba'ath Party, and head of the Northern Organization Office for the period 1987-1989. Trial
Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 481. The IHT also found that he was given wide authority by the
Revolutionary Command Council to command all civilian, military, security and party organizations in the
Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq. Id.
16. As to these documents-Documents Nos. 3650 and 4008-the IHT stated: "These two letters
are considered the pillars upon which all attacks after [April 6, 1987] were based." Id. at 512.
17. Id. at 610. The document was directed to the Commanders ofthe 1 st, 2d and 5th Corps, Ba'ath
Party Branches Command, Security Directors of the Autonomous Region, the Directorates of the General
Military Intelligence Directorate and Intelligence System. See id at 481; Trial Chamber Judgment, supra
note 4, at 610. All quoted documents and quotes from the Trial and Cassation Chamber Judgments have been
translated from the original Arabic.
18. Id. at 481, 610, 623.
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on . . ."; "9 "I will tell them there is an amnesty .... I will print a million
pamphlet[s] and spread them in the north. . . and I will not mention that it is
from the state of Iraq"; 20 "I will [kill] them with the new weapon which will
eradicate you, God willing; all God's vehicles are not enough to carry them; I
told the specialists, I need gangs ... the good ones in Europe to kill them
wherever they catch them";21 "[s]trike them chemically and eradicate them all
.... They thought the International community will rescue them .... Damn
this International community .... [a]nd any of God's States who back them., 22
The other convicted defendants included two military figures- Sultan
Hashem Ahmad al-Ta'i (Sultan Ahmad) and Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti (Hussein
Rashid),23 and two individuals who headed intelligence service branches-Sabir
Abd al-Aziz al-Douri (al-Douri) and Farhan Mutlaq al-Jaburi (al-Jaburi). 24 As
to these defendants, while the evidence was certainly not as strong, it is
possible, at minimum, to deduce from the documentary evidence that each knew
that Iraqi armed forces were attacking villages (not just the Kurdish
"Peshmerga" insurgents), and that chemical weapons were being used (a
weapon that is completely incapable of discriminating between civilian and
military targets).
Majid, Sultan Ahmad, and Hussein Rashid were sentenced to death, and
al-Douri and al-Jaburi were sentenced to life sentences.26 The Tribunal found
that Sultan Ahmad, as a military commander, "implemented" the Anfal plans,
27
and that Hussein Rashid participated in planning, and provided supplies,
resources, and technical expertise to the military.28 As to al-Douri, the IHT
found that he gathered and supplied information to the military to conduct their
operations.2 9 As to al-Jaburi, the IHT found that he provided "information
19. Id. at 483.
20. Id. at 484.
21. Id.
22. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 514.
23. Sultan Ahmad was former commander of the 1 st Corps, which was based in northern Iraq and
involved in several, but not all, of the eight Anfal operations. Hussein Rashid was Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations during the Anfal campaign.
24. AI-Douri was former general director of Iraq's Military Intelligence Service. AI-Jaburi was
former director of the Military Intelligence Service of the northern and later eastern regions.
25. A more extensive analysis of the documentary evidence and role of each convicted defendant
is set forth in Trahan, supra note 1.
26. See Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 957 (sentence of Majid); id. at 949 (sentence
of Sultan Ahmad); id. at 953 (sentence of Hussein Rashid); id. at 946 (sentence of al-Duri); id. at 943
(sentence of al-Jaburi).
27. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 695.
28. Id. at 767, 750.
29. Id. at 802.
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about targeted villages,"3 and was "in charge of sending Kurdish villagers to
[the] North[ern] Organization Office, supervising interrogations, [and]
executing detainees....",31 A sixth defendant, Tahir Tawfiq al-'Aani (al-'Aani)
was acquitted.32 Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti
(Saddam Hussein) was dropped from the trial after his execution as a result of
the verdict in the IHT's Dujail trial. None of the death sentences in the Anfal
case have been carried out due to political disagreement within the Iraqi
Government as to whether they should be implemented.33
H. THE TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENT
The Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment consists of 963 pages. At least read
in translation, it is meandering, repetitive, hard to read, and not always well-
organized. Yet, generally, as to each crime, it: i) contains analysis of the
elements of the crime; ii) cites to evidence presented at trial that supports the
Tribunal's conclusions as to the elements; and iii) shows a linkage that satisfies
"individual criminal responsibility"-that is, how each convicted defendant was
implicated in each crime.34 The IHT often does not clearly identify which form
of individual criminal responsibility it found, generally entering the convictions
under the article of the Statute dealing with individual criminal responsibility
generally, but not making clear under which sub-part it was operating (i.e.,
which particular form of responsibility it found). Yet, a careful analysis, which
is beyond the scope of this presentation but has been done by this Author
elsewhere,35 suggests that one or more forms of individual criminal
responsibility appears to be present as to each crime.
In terms of the crimes against humanity convictions, it is not hard to
understand how a multi-phased military campaign that involved a huge number
of civilian fatalities constituted a crime against humanity. The facts presented
at trial (as recounted in the Trial Chamber Judgment)36 clearly show a
30. Id. at 917.
31. Id. at 917-18.
32. Trial ChamberJudgment, supra note 4, at 943. Al-'Aani was former Governor of Mosul during
the Anfal campaign and a Ba'ath party official.
33. Particularly Sunni Arabs advocate that the death sentence regarding Sultan Ahmad should not
be carried out. See, e.g., Ross Colvin, U.S. Rebuffs Iraq Demandfor Handover ofPrisoners, REUTERS, Nov.
12,2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLI 260151520071112 (last visited Feb 24,2009).
34. The forms of individual criminal responsibility are contained in Article 15 of the IHT Statute.
See Al-Waqa' Al-Iraqiya: Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, No. 4006, Oct. 18, 2005, at 15-16, available at http://www.ictj.org/static/
MENA/Iraq/iraq.statute.engtrans.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter IHT Statute].
35. The Author has done such a crime-by-crime analysis elsewhere. See Trahan, supra note 1.
36. The analysis presented herein is based on the evidence recounted in the Trial Chamber
Judgment. The Author has not independently reviewed the evidence presented at trial.
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widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population pursuant to a
plan or policy. 7 As to the underlying crimes, Majid was convicted of: i) willful
killing; ii) extermination (that is, mass killing); iii) deportation or forcible
transfer of population; iv) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental norms of international law; v) torture; vi)
enforced disappearances; and vii) other inhumane acts of similar character
intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or to mental
or physical health.3" The IHT relied upon eye-witness testimony in concluding
that these crimes occurred, as well as documentary evidence as to some of
them.39 Regarding the crimes against humanity convictions, each of the other
convicted defendants was convicted of fewer underlying crimes (thus, fewer
counts) than Majid.40
As to war crimes, the Trial Chamber judgment cites to both eye-witness
testimony as well as documentary evidence in concluding that the Iraqi military,
inter alia, targeted civilians in the context of its fight against the insurgents,
which it found to constitute "internal armed conflict.""' The war crimes of
which Majid was convicted were: i) intentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population; ii) ordering the displacement of the civilian population for
reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand; iii) intentionally directing attacks
37. For example, the judges found: (1) that the Anfal campaign "constitute[d] an attack within the
concept [of the Tribunal Statute]," Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 519; (2) that "civil[ian]
inhabitants in Kurdish villages" were the subject of the attack, id. at 522; (3) that the attack was "widespread"
and "systematic," relying on the fact that "more than three thousand villages" were targeted, and the
operations "relied on organized plans laid down and applied by officials in the former regime," id. at 519;
and (4) that the attack was pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, see id. at 520 ("all
attacks, which occurred after [June 1987] were an implementation of a stipulated policy [reflected] in the
instructions issued by... Majid according to Letter [4008]"). The evidence clearly also shows that the
defendants' acts were part of the attack and it is possible to infer that they knew that their acts constituted
part of the attack.
38. Id. at 527, 537, 545, 552, 560, 568, 574 (convicting Majid of those underlying crimes).
39. For example, Documents Nos. 3650 and 4008 both suggest that killing and mass killing
occurred.
40. The Trial Chamber convicted Sultan Ahmad of murder, extermination, deportation or forcible
transfer of population, imprisonment, and other inhumane acts. See Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note
4, at 665-66, 660,675,699,701,704,705-06,708. The Trial Chamber convicted Hussein Rashid of murder
and extermination. Id. at 766, 774. The Trial Chamber convicted al-Jaburi of willful killing and "deportation
or forcible transfer of population." Id. at 944. The Trial Chamber convicted al-Douri of willful killing. Id.
at 871.
41. Id. at 595, 579. The Tribunal also concluded, for example, as to Majid, that he "was fully
aware of factual conditions which [established] an internal armed conflict's existence." Trial Chamber
Judgment, supra note 4, at 595. In terms of a nexus between the crimes and the armed conflict, the IHT
found: "it is clear that these crimes were committed in a time and geographic frame during the military
conflict (1987-88) linked to the attack on Kurdistan in AI-Anfal operations." Id. at 579.
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against buildings dedicated to religious or educational purposes, or against
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they
are not military objectives-here, schools, mosques and a medical clinic;4 2 iv)
pillage; and v) destroying or seizing the property of an adversary, unless such
destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of the
conflict. 3 The eye-witness testimony at trial supported the Tribunal's findings
as to these crimes." Again, each of the other convicted defendants was
convicted of fewer war crimes (thus, fewer counts) than Majid.45
As to the crime of genocide, the IHT found that there was intent to destroy,
based on a variety of factors, including: the use of aircraft, tanks, artillery, heli-
copters, rocket launchers, infantry and "special ammunitions" (i.e., chemical
weapons) to attack the Iraqi Kurds;46 the direct orders from Majid to carry out
the attack-banning the existence of individuals between fifteen and seventy
years of age (included);47 direct orders from Majid to kill the largest possible
number of people;4" that the attacking troops prevented individuals from
escaping so that none were able to cross the borders into Turkey;49 that
attacking troops "did not distinguish between the victims ... [as] civilians or
fighters ([Peshmerga]);" '5 that thousands of children, women and elderly were
killed by chemical weapons;5' that the former regime "prevented... humanit-
[arian] organizations from entering Kurdistan to... find out the circumstances
of the victims";52 that the attacking troops destroyed "the electricity and water
[filtration systems]";53 and that animal and human existence was prohibited in
the restricted areas.54 The IHT also relied on the intentions expressed by Majid
42. The IHT found that "more than 3000 villages were totally destroyed," including approximately
"1000 primary and preparatory schools[,] ... more than 2000 mosques," and a medical clinic. Id at 589.
43. See id. at 582, 586-87, 592, 596, 600-01.
44. There may be some question whether the last war crime--destroying or seizing the property of
an adversary-occurred, because the evidence at trial showed that civilian objects were targeted. The crime,
however, appears to cover the destruction of property of an "adversary," which suggests a military adversary.
45. The Trial Chamber convicted Sultan Ahmad of four war crimes, see id at 679, 682, 684, 711,
713, 715, 717-18; Hussein Rashid of two war crimes, see Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 783;
id. at 788; and al-Douri of two war crimes, see id. at 872-82; id at 883-96.
46. Id. at 493.
47. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 494.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 500.
51. Id. at 494.
52. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 498.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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in the audio-taped recordings." The Tribunal additionally found a "strategy and
prepared policy by the regime to target the Kurds.""
Based on all the evidence, the IHT ultimately concluded that Majid
possessed "intent to partially or totally eradicate Kurdish civilians due to their
ethnicity."57 The Tribunal went through similar analysis as the other elements
of genocide's dolus specialis, finding that the intent to destroy targeted in
whole or in part," "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (here, the
Iraqi Kurds)59 as such6" (that is, because of their group membership).6' The
underlying crimes supporting the genocide convictions as to Majid are: i)
killing members of the group; ii) inflicting serious bodily or mental harm on
members of the group; and iii) creating conditions of life calculated to destroy
the group in whole or in part.62 Again, most of the other convicted defendants
were convicted of fewer underlying crimes (and thus fewer counts) than
Majid.63
55. Id. at 514.
56. Id. at 497. Specifically, the IHT relied on Document No. 4008 and the fact that Majid (author
of the document) was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and a member of the Ba'ath Party
leadership. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 497. Additionally the Tribunal found that evidence
of the plan came from the "repetition" and "systematization" of the attacks, and the way mass executions were
prepared. Id. at 499-500. Case law states that a plan or policy is not required to prove intent to destroy,
although it may be an important factor in evaluating whether or not there is intent to destroy. See Prosecutor
v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 225 (Apr. 19, 2004).
57. Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 516.
58. Id. at 501 (finding "partial eradication").
59. The Iraqi part of the Kurdish ethnic group was targeted. See id. at 490 (finding ethnic and
national group targeting); id. at 493 ("The Kurds are a national and ethnic group living in [the] Kurdistan
area for many thousands of years in... northern Iraq and the Iraqi temporary constitution [of] 1970 had
endorse[d] them as [the] second nationality in Iraq.") (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 490 ("[t]he Kurds were targeted for their ethnicity"). This appears to be an
oversimplification, as another motivation was likely to target the Kurds for political reasons.
61. See Prosecutorv. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 669 (Jan. 17,2005).
The judge who wrote the section of the Trial Chamber Judgment discussing Sultan Ahmad persuasively
explains that the existence of any political motivation for targeting the Kurds (e.g., for supporting the
Peshmerga insurgency and/or Iran during the Iran/Iraq war) does not negate genocidal intent. See Trial
Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 629 (citing the ICTR case of Nahimana at 969). Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 969 (Nov. 28, 2007). This is
a correct conclusion. See Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
990, 1037-40 (2008) (discussing the case law distinguishing motive and intent regarding genocide). Due
to differences in writing style and duplication of effort, the Author assumes that each of the five Trial
Chamber Judges wrote one of the sections in the Trial Chamber Judgment covering one of the five convicted
defendants.
62. See Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 490-502, 502-06, 506-17.
63. Sultan Ahmad was convicted of all three underlying crimes. See id. at 631-40, 641-43,
644-49. Hussein Rashid and al-Douri were convicted of the first two. See id. at 755; id. at 842, 859. Al-
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One point of criticism, however, is that as to the four convicted defendants
other than Majid, the Tribunal never found that they possessed genocidal intent.
Rather, the findings seem to be that they participated in and/or assisted with the
Anfal campaign, knowing of Majid's genocidal intent. 4 This is the mens rea
of aiding and abetting genocide.65 Yet, the Tribunal does not appear to
differentiate between a conviction of genocide and a conviction of aiding and
abetting genocide.
The failure to convict Sultan Ahmad, Hussein Rashid, al-Douri and al-
Jaburi of aiding and abetting genocide, rather than genocide, constitutes
possible legal error, and one that may have resulted in a sentencing error. There
exists international precedent that the responsibility of an aider and abettor is
less than that of a perpetrator.66 Furthermore, the Iraqi High Tribunal Statute
(HIT Statute) states that in terms of sentencing, where the crimes do not have
a counterpart under Iraqi law (as these crimes did not), the Tribunal shall be
guided by "judicial precedents and relevant sentences issued by the
international criminal tribunals,"67 making international standards relevant.
Yet, if Sultan Ahmad and Hussein Rashid were sentenced to death along with
Majid, that differentiation between a primary perpetrator (such as one who
orders the campaign) and an aider and abettor (one who assists the primary
perpetrator but does not have the required mens rea of a primary perpetrator)
was not made.68 Additionally, all convicted defendants other than Maj id argued
that they were "following orders,"69 which, under the IHT Statute, permits
Jaburi was convicted of killing and may have been convicted of the second underlying crime. Compare id.
at 922 with Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 943.
64. For example, as to Sultan Ahmad, the IHT stated: "The accused (Sultan Hashim Ahmad) knew
that the accused ( Ali HasanAl-Majid) intended to commit genocide against the Kurdish civilians in Northern
Iraq ... and he was required to take necessary actions to achieve the aims and intentions of[Majid." Id.
at 693 (emphasis added); see also id. at 695.
65. The mens rea of an aider and abetter requires that "'an accused knew that his own acts assisted
in the commission of genocide by the principal offender and was aware of the principal offender's state of
mind .... ' Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 730 (Sept. 1, 2004).
66. See Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 268 ("aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which
generally warrants lower sentences than responsibility as a co-perpetrator"); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case
No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, 181, 182 (Feb. 25, 2004) (similar); Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-
25-A, Judgment, 73 (Sept. 17, 2003) (similar).
67. HT Statute, supra note 34, art. 21.
68. While these comments focus on the possible sentencing error as to Sultan Ahmad and Hussein
Rashid, they should not be taken as an endorsement of the death penalty for Majid. The Author opposes
implementation of the death penalty as to any lHT defendant. The fair trial issues raised in this article as well
as lack of serious appellate review (discussed infra) suggest that no death sentences should be carried out.
69. See, e.g., Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, at 624, 625 (Sultan Ahmed testified that he
acted under orders).
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mitigation of sentences;" again, this cannot have occurred where death
sentences were imposed. All these factors suggest that the death sentences
against Sultan Ahmad and Hussein Rashid (and potentially the life sentences
against al-Douri and al-Jaburi) may have been the product of legal error. This
potential error is extremely significant, given that the death sentences have not
yet been executed. Other than this potential (and significant) error, this
Author's analysis is that the Trial Chamber Judgment generally demonstrates
that most of the other convictions were supported by the evidence with two
significant caveats. "'
I. FAIR TRIAL ISSUES
The merits of the Trial Chamber Judgment, nonetheless, only represent a
partial picture, one that does not reflect the fair trial problems, or at least,
potential problems, that arose during the trial.
Why does one have to be scrupulous to ensure fair trials, even for the worst
dictators and their henchmen? Judge Pavel Dolenc summarized this persuasively
in the case of Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, andlmanishimwe72 before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) where (in the context of
examining indictment defects)73 he wrote: "In my opinion, the legitimacy and
legacy of this Tribunal rests as much on the fairness of the proceedings as on the
substance of the Judgments that we deliver. It is only through fair and equitable
proceedings that international justice is achieved."74 This holds equally true for
any tribunal attempting to ensure internationally accepted standards of fairness,
as the IHT Statute requires of the IHT.75 It is true that the Anfal trial occurred
70. IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 17.
71. As shown below, there were significant fair trial issues, and appellate review was inadequate.
Thus, even as to convictions as to which the evidence appeared to be solid, this article does not necessarily
suggest those convictions should stand. The Author also has a few specific criticisms of some of the
convictions, which appear to lack findings as to certain elements of the crimes and/or individual criminal
responsibility and which are explained in detail by the Author elsewhere. See Trahan, supra note 1.
72. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and lmanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment & Sentence (Feb. 25, 2004).
73. These were eloquent words, by ajudge who faced a difficult decision. The case involved, inter alia,
gruesome rape charges, but the Indictment alleged it was soldiers from one camp that committed rape, when, in
fact, the facts at trial showed that it was soldiers from the camp where the defendant was in command who
committed rape, but because the Indictment charged it incorrectly, the Trial Chamber dismissed the charges. See
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-SSA-T, Judgment & Sentence, 526 (Sept. 12, 2006) (finding
Muvunyi not guilty of rape because the Indictment alleged soldiers from Ngoma Camp committed rape, and the
evidence at trial was that soldiers from the ESO Camp committed rape).
74. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and lmanishimwe, Trial Chamber, 5 (Feb. 25, 2004),
Separate Opinion of Judge Pavel Dolenc.
75. Article 19 of the IHT Statute reproduces almost identically the fair trial protections contained
in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 14. International
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while Iraq was undergoing civil war, and the judges had never adjudicated these
types of cases before and had been cut-off during Ba'ath Party rule from the
significant developments in the field of international justice, including the work
of the two ad hoc tribunals. Yet, given that the IHT Statute incorporates
internationally accepted fair trial standards, these do appear to be an appropriate
benchmark against which to evaluate the trial.76
The difficulty regarding the fair trial issues that arose during the trial is
that there do not appear to be reasoned decisions resolving them. (Or, if there
are, it is unclear where they may be located.) Possibilities include oral
resolutions of some issues, or that motion papers may have been marked-up by
the judges, with rulings in the margins. It may not have been Iraqi practice to
rule upon procedural motions in writing and in detail, but in terms of posterity
and convincing the public that the Iraqi High Tribunal was fair (if it was), the
judges should have memorialized such decisions in reasoned, written rulings,
either finding that there were no fair trial violations, that there were fair trial
violations but they did not undermine the outcome, or, potentially, even
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
Compare ICCPR, Article 14 with IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
76. Article 19 of the IHT Statute provides:
First: All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal.
Second: The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the
Tribunal in accordance with this law.
Third: Every accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, in accordance with the
provisions of this law and the rules of procedure made hereunder.
Fourth: When bringing charges against the accused pursuant to this Law, the accused
shall be entitled to afair impartial trial in accordance with the following minimum
guarantees:
A. To be informed promptly and in detail of the content, nature and cause
of the charge against him;
B. To have adequate time andfacilities for the preparation of his defense
and to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing and to
meet with him in private. The accused is entitled to have non-Iraqi legal
representation so long as the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi;
C. To be tried without undue delay;
D. To be tried in his presence, and to be assisted by counsel of his own
choosing, or to be informed of his right to request legal assistance if he
cannot afford it; and to have the right to seek such assistance that will
allow him to appoint a lawyer without paying the fees;
E. To have the right to call and examine defense and prosecution
witnesses, and to present any evidence in his defense in accordance
with the law;
F. Not to be compelled to confess guilt, and to have the right to remain
silent and not to testify without such silence being interpreted as
evidence of guilt or innocence.
1HTStatute, supra note 34, art. 19 (emphasis added).
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vacating parts of the convictions, or reducing sentences, if there were
violations.77 The failure to resolve these issues is one of the two blemishes
tarnishing the otherwise noteworthy achievements of the trial.
What are these fair trial issues? The first is the issue of Iraqi Government
interference with thejudicial panel. The Government removed Presiding Judge
Abdallah al-Amiri near the start of the trial and replaced him with Judge
Muhammad Uraybi al-Khalifa after Judge Amiri's comment that Saddam
Hussein was "not a dictator."7 This was not done pursuant to any procedures,
so it appears wholly political. If it was, it potentially violates the right to a fair
impartial trial guaranteed by the IHT Statute.79 Various de-Ba'athification
purges, of the IHT, may also have had an impact on the composition and
fairness of the bench.80
Second, the charges (both times they were presented before proceedings
opened and at the close of the Prosecution's case)81 were framed only in general
terms, and did not detail the individual roles of the defendants.8 2 If they were
77. For example, in the ICTR's case Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber reduced
Kajelijeli's sentence in part because it found that his rights were violated during arrest and detention. See
Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 9 323 (May 23, 2005) (finding, "he was not
promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest or of the provisional charges against him, and... he was not
promptly granted an initial appearance before a Judge or an official acting in a judicial capacity without
undue delay"); see also Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, It 325-28 (May 20,
2005) (granting a six-month reduction in the sentence for rights violations).
78. See ICTJ, Update I, supra note 8, at 13.
79. IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
80. ICTJ, Update I, supra note 8, at 3 (suggesting that the interference of the De-Ba'athification
Commission and members of the Iraqi legislative branch, including the Prime Minister, compromisedjudicial
independence during the Dujail trial). Michael A. Newton and Michael P. Scharf, in their book recent
book-which generally praises the work of the IHT-do admit that the lack of controls regarding how de-
Ba'athification was conducted "created a black hole of politicized influence" over the Tribunal. MICHAEL
A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OFTHE STATE: THE TRIALAND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
101-02 (2008) [hereinafter ENEMY OF THE STATE]. These authors note that there was no oversight
mechanism to ensure "that political interests outside the tribunal did not use the de-Ba'athification
requirement as a pretext for exercising undue control over the judges and prosecutors." Id. at 101.
81. Charges are presented at two stages under Iraqi law: the "qirar al ihala," before proceedings
open, and then the "qirar al tuhm," at the close of the prosecution's case. Law on Crim. Proceedings, The
Revolutionary Command Council, Law No. 23 of 197 1, 99 131, 181 (Iraq).
82. See Int'l Ctr. For Transitional Justice [ICTJ], The Anfal Trial and the Iraqi High Tribunal
Update Number Three: The Defense Phase and Closing Stages of the Anfal Trial, at 10,
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/7/2/726.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter ICTJ, Update 111]
("As was the case in Dujail, the Tribunal used umbrella charges whereby all of the defendants were charged
with the same charges, and were alleged to have perpetrated those crimes through all modes of criminal
[responsibility].").
inadequate, that would violate the right "[t]o be informed promptly and in detail
of the content, nature and cause of the charge" against each defendant.83
Third, investigations were opened regarding two private defense counsel
involved in the trial, causing them to flee Iraq," which may have had a chilling
effect on defense representation, and/or an impact regarding the two attorneys'
clients. Given limited information, it is hard to evaluate if the investigations
were properly opened or done to undermine, or send a chilling message to, the
defense. At issue is the right to a "fair impartial trial" 5 and the right "to be
assisted by counsel of [the defendant's] own choosing." 6
Fourth, the defendants were barely able to introduce any defense
witnesses-only a total of five, four of whom were character witnesses, and one
whose testimony does not appear to have been relevant. It is understandable
that individuals may have been hesitant to be seen speaking in favor of the
defendants and/or may have feared they too could face charges if they came
forward to testify." Yet, the optics of having virtually no defense witnesses is
clearly problematic. At issue is the right to call and examine defense and
prosecution witnesses 9 and the principle of "equality of arms.'"90
Fifth, during the trial, there were times when the defendants and defense
counsel boycotted the proceedings.9' The assigned counsel then asked to
represent the defendants were extremely passive. It is unclear whether they
were: i) unprepared; ii) afraid, for example, due to threats by Saddam Hussein
(while he was still alive); iii) afraid of being seen publicly to defend the
defendants; or iv) acting on instructions from their clients. At issue is the right
"to be assisted by counsel,"92 interpreted to require "effective" assistance of
counsel.9 3 Some have argued vis-A-vis the Dujail trial, that assigned counsel
83. 1HTStatute, supra note 34, art. 19.
84. ICTJ, Update III, supra note 82, at 17-18.
85. HT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
86. Id.
87. See ICTJ, Update III, supra note 82, at 11-12.
88. As to potential witness located outside of Iraq, the IHT's rules allowed for the hearing of
testimony by video-link. See Rules of Procedure and Gathering of Evidence With Regard to the Supreme
Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, A-Waqa'I Al-lraqiya, OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, No. 4006, Oct.
18, 2005, R. 57 (the Trial Chamber has the power to hear evidence submitted "via such media
communications, including video or satellite channels, and as the Tribunal may order."). Yet such video-
linked testimony was not utilized.
89. 1HT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
90. Id. ("All persons shall be equal before the Court.").
91. ICTJ, Update I, supra note 8, at 6.
92. IHTStatute, supra note 34, art. 19.
93. See Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment,
130 (Nov. 28, 2007) ("The Appeals Chamber has for long recognized ... the right of an ... accused to be
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were ably assisted by an international defense lawyer, a Canadian, so there was
in fact effective assistance.94 It is, however, unclear why representation behind
the scenes should be treated as the equivalent of effective assistance in court.95
Sixth, the defendants appear to have made a huge number of motions to the
Trial Chamber, which, as best as can be determined, never received articulate,
reasoned responses. The right at issue is the right to a fair and impartial trial96
and the right to an appeal 97 -since it is extremely hard to appeal motions that
were (presumably) denied but as to which reasoned written responses are
lacking.
Seventh, as discussed below, the requirement that appeal papers be filed
within thirty days of the Trial Chamber verdict regarding a trial of the size and
complexity of the Anfal trial was palpably inadequate. At issue is the right
"[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [the] defense."98
Eighth, also as discussed below, the Cassation Chamber Judgment appears
so lacking in analysis of legal and factual issues that it hardly constitutes a
reasoned decision, potentially nullifying the right to an appeal.99
The lack of reasoned rulings on all of these issues was a missed
opportunity by the Trial Chamber judges to demonstrate that they ruled fairly
on these, or at least some of these, issues. The failure was compounded when
the Cassation Chamber never seriously addressed fair trial issues.1"' All this,
of course, leads to the critical question of whether the convictions (well-
reasoned as they, for the most part, appear to be in the Trial Chamber judgment)
ought to stand. For example, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ICTR, if the charges were never adequately
presented (with material facts supporting them), and if the defects were not
deemed "cured" (for example, through the prosecution's pre-trial brief or
opening statement),' 0 then defective charges or convictions are stricken or
represented by competent counsel."). For application regarding the right to effective legal assistance, see id.
117-28, 130-69.
94. ENEMY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 222, 230 (Newton and Scharf making this argument).
95. As to the Dujail trial, it appears that the international defense advisor only commenced his work
several months into that trial. Author interview with Nehal Bhuta (Oct. 31, 2008).
96. IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
97. ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 14.5 ("Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.").
98. IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
99. See id. art. 25 (providing for appeals); see also ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 14.5 (providing for
the right to an appeal).
100. The Cassation Chamber Judgment devoted one superficial paragraph to three fair trial issues,
addressing none sufficiently.
101. Both the ICTY and ICTR have recognized that information set forth in the prosecution's
opening statement as well as the prosecution's pre-trial brief may be considered in determining whether a
600 [Vol. 15:2
2009] Trahan
vacated. 0 2 The IHT, by contrast, appears not to perform this analysis of the
charges at all, even though the right "[t]o be informed ... in detail of the
content, nature and cause of the charge against [the defendant]"' 3-the same
right pursuant to which the ICTY and ICTR perform this type of analysis-is
contained in the lHT's Statute." Neither did the Cassation Chamber judges
give any serious consideration to this, or any other, fair trial issue.'05
IV. THE CASSATION CHAMBER (APPEAL) JUDGMENT
The second huge defect of the trial lies in the Cassation Chamber
Judgment, which suggests that appellate review was wholly inadequate. First,
as mentioned above, the timing of providing the defendants, after this extremely
complex trial and very lengthy Trial Chamberjudgment, only thirty days to file
their appeals papers was palpably inadequate. Second, the quality of the
Cassation Chamber judgment does not suggest that there was any serious legal
review.
It is true that one cannot necessarily conclude too much about the merits
of a decision based on its length,0 6 but one can conclude something. Here,
there was a 963-page Trial Chamber decision, concerning numerous convictions
for three crimes based on a panoply of underlying crimes involving five
defendants pertaining to various (not always clearly identified) forms of
individual criminal responsibility, with a panoply of fair trial issues. One is
hard-pressed to imagine how all of this could have been adequately addressed
defect in the indictment has been "cured" through subsequent timely, clear, and consistent information. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Radic, Zigic, & Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, IN 44-46 (Feb. 28, 2005)
(considering the pre-trial brief and prosecutor's opening statement); Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No.
IT-95-14/2-A, -" 140, 169 (Dec. 17, 2004) (indictment supplemented by the prosecution's pre-trial brief;
information contained in an opening statement of the prosecution may cure a defective indictment).
102. "If insufficient notice has violated the accused's right to a fair trial, no conviction may result."
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 47 (June 20, 2007) ("the AFRC
Judgment"); Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 142 ("if an indictment is insufficiently specific,
such a defect 'may, in certain circumstances cause the Appeals Chamber to reverse a conviction.').
103. IHT Statute, supra note 34, art. 19.
104. There is some tension contained in the IHT Statute which simultaneously suggests that Iraqi
Procedural rules will apply, see id. art. 16, and incorporates internationally accepted fair trial standards, see
id. art. 19.
105. The Cassation Chamber Judgment cursorily dismissed challenges regarding the legitimacy of
the Tribunal, the lack of defense witnesses and experts, and the adequacy of the charges, in a few sentences
each.
106. Michael Newton and Michael Scharf make this argument in criticizing Human Rights Watch
for being critical of the seventeen page length of the Dujail appeal verdict. See ENEMY OF THE STATE, supra
note 80, at 192-93.
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in the twenty-eight page judgment issued by the Cassation Chamber. Indeed,
it was not.
The Cassation Chamber decision primarily: recites the convictions against
each defendant; lists some, but not all, of the arguments raised on appeal by the
defendants; and recites what appear to be the Trial Chamber's conclusions as
to the role each defendant played with respect to the Anfal campaign (without
analyzing issues of individual criminal responsibility). It also mentions some
of the elements of the crimes, either parts of the "chapeau" and/or underlying
crimes (but with no analysis as to whether the elements were satisfied or not). 7
The Cassation Chamber decision does not: i) seriously grapple with procedural
and/or fair trial challenges; ii) examine the elements of any of the crimes and
whether or not they were proven; iii) examine the elements of individual
criminal responsibility and whether or not it was proven; iv) respond to a
plethora of the defendants' arguments raised on appeal; or v) examine whether
the sentences were properly imposed-for example whether Sultan Ahmad and
Hussein Rashid, if they were "aiders and abettors" of genocide'--should have
received the death penalty. These are no trivial flaws.
It may not have been past practice in Iraq to render lengthy written
decisions, but when: i) a statute incorporates the fair trial protections of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the IHT Statute
does; ii) a tribunal wants to establish that it stands for respect for the rule of law
following on the heals of a regime that did not respect it; iii) the crimes are
extremely serious, involving an estimated 182,000 victims who deserve to have
a real accounting of what occurred; and iv) the punishments available are as
serious as the death penalty and life in prison, there is clearly a need for a
seriously reasoned written opinion at both the trial and appellate levels. The
lack of serious appellate review that is suggested by the Cassation Chamber
Judgment may rise to the level of a violation of the right to review by a higher
tribunal. 9
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, first, there can be no doubt that horrific crimes were
committed as part of the Anfal campaign. There was convincing eye-witness
107. See generally Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra note 5.
108. The Author does not mean to suggest that aiding and abetting genocide is not an extremely
serious crime; rather, that aiding and abetting is generally seen as a lesser form of responsibility for
sentencing purposes. See Brdanin, supra note 65.
109. The right to review by a higher tribunal has been construed to require a "genuine review of the
issues in the case." Amnesty Int'l USA [A1USA], The Right to Appeal, Fair Trials Manual: Genuine
Review, at 26.3, available at http://www.amnestyusa.orglintemational-justice/the-right-to-a-fair-
trial/page.do?id=1 104744 (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
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testimony presented at trial as to the crimes, persuasive documentary evidence
was introduced, and Majid's own intentions were captured on audio-tape played
at trial; this was an inherently strong case. Second, the Trial Chamber judges
persuasively marshaled this evidence and generally matched it to the elements
of the crimes fairly well, analyzing the "chapeau" of the three crimes at issue
as well as each underlying crime as to each defendant. While the judges were
somewhat opaque about what form of individual criminal responsibility they
found, as to each defendant, that linkage generally appears to be present."'
Third, the Trial Chamber does not appear to take fair trial issues seriously
enough or has not created a reasoned, written record of having done so. Fourth,
the Cassation Chamber does not appear to take appellate review seriously at all,
or so one might conclude from review of the Cassation Chamber Judgment.
One should not be unmindful of the serious difficulties of starting up a
tribunal, particularly during a period of civil war, and suddenly demanding that
the judges adjudicate extremely complex crimes and forms of individual
criminal responsibility, while adhering to internationally accepted fair trial
standards. The IHT judges had a hugely challenging task handed to them, and
they acted bravely to even adjudicate these cases at all, at no small personal risk
to themselves."' Credit should be given to them where it is due, but also
criticism where it is warranted. If the IHT is to be seen as a credible institution
(and the jury is still out as this assessment is rather a mixed verdict), it will have
to improve.
110. A full analysis of individual criminal responsibility can be found in Trahan, supra note 1. It
appears that as to most crimes, the IHT found what is referred to as a "type I"joint criminal enterprise. As
to a few crimes, it appears to have found a "type 3"joint criminal enterprise. As to the genocide convictions
other than Majid's it should have found "aiding and abetting" responsibility.
11. There were five liT-related fatalities during the Dujail trial alone. See DUJAIL: TRIAL AND
ERROR?, supra note 2, at 8.
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